Occasionally accidents and complications occur during anaesthesia and perioperative care that result in injury to the patient. Unfortunately this is sometimes due to a breach in the anaesthetist's duty of care to the patient. These breaches may be an action or omission in the diagnosis and/or treatment of a complaint and the communications surrounding these processes. Often the injury is not related to the disease process (for example, the anaesthetist damages the patient's teeth during endotracheal intubation or the patient is traumatised by awareness and recollection of intraoperative events). Sometimes, however, the action/ omission results in an alteration in the prognosis of the complaint or increased risk of complications related to the complaint. This may be because the anaesthetist has failed to make a diagnosis, give the patient options or treat the complaint when the underlying disease or trauma had higher curability (for example, the anaesthetist fails to diagnose critical coronary stenosis preoperatively and the patient suffers an intraoperative myocardial infarction, or the anaesthetist fails to diagnose an epidural abscess at a point when treatment might prevent permanent disability). This avenue for a negligence action is known as 'loss of chance of a better outcome' and has been the subject of much legal argument in Australia in recent years. The matter was argued before the High Court of Australia in the case of Tabet v Gett 1 , a decision that is widely seen as having 'closed the door' to, or at least made it difficult for the patient to succeed in, loss of chance cases 2,3 . This review will explore the concept of loss of chance and the manner in which Australian courts have dealt with it before and after Tabet v Gett from the perspective of the anaesthetist.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE ANAESTHETIC CASE
A case involving an anaesthetist may be illustrative at this point 4 . In Haylock v Morris and Anor 5 , the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to adequately warn him of the risks associated with epidural anaes-thesia and then was negligent with respect to his intraoperative and postoperative care. The plaintiff developed anterior spinal artery syndrome and permanent paraplegia. During the course of the case, the plaintiff (the patient) was unable to establish that, if warned about the risk of anterior spinal artery syndrome, he would definitely have opted for general anaesthesia. The plaintiff was also unable to prove that the defendant's intraoperative management of the plaintiff's blood pressure was either negligent or causal. Counsel for the plaintiff then mounted the argument that the defendant's failure to discontinue an epidural local anaesthetic infusion when the patient was unable to move his legs postoperatively deprived the plaintiff of the chance to have the anterior spinal artery syndrome diagnosed sooner, when it was potentially reversible. This also was not proven, with his Honour commenting that (at [75] 5 ):
There is a crucial distinction between cases in which it can be proved on the balance of probabilities that such a chance has been lost and cases in which the evidence does not permit any finding as to what might have occurred. It must be an actual chance that has been lost; a mere inability to prove the absence of a relevant possibility will not suffice. In the present case the evidence simply does not reveal whether or not turning off the infusion would have made any difference.
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND LOSS OF CHANCE
Medical negligence is a civil action initiated under the common law and under various statutes following so-called 'tort law reform' (e.g. the Wrongs Act 6 ). For a traditional medical negligence case to be successful, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: • a duty of care was owed by the doctor (defendant), • the duty of care was breached by the defendant, • the plaintiff suffered an injury or experienced measurable harm, • the injury was caused by the defendant's breach of duty, and • the injury was foreseeable as a result of the defendant's breach 7 .
While each of these elements must be addressed, the case is often focused primarily on causation where the breach and the damage are proven. Establishing causation requires the plaintiff to prove, on the balance of probabilities (i.e. >50%), that the defendant's negligence was a cause of the damage 6 . If this substantial hurdle is cleared, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the entire damage or loss suffered. If the hurdle is not cleared, then the plaintiff receives nothing.
In response to the difficulty that plaintiffs commonly experience in proving causation on the balance of probabilities, actions based on an expanded definition of injury to the possibility (i.e. <50% probability) of a better outcome have been pursued 8, 9 . In loss of chance cases, the outcome can be hypothetical. No-one can really know if the patient's prognosis was changed by the doctor's breach, either before or after the fact of the projected unwanted outcome. The apportionment of the unwanted outcome between the defendant and other factors, therefore, is speculative. If the action is successful, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation to the extent of the defendant's contribution to the unwanted outcome (which is often ≤50%). The differences between traditional and loss of chance actions in negligence are summarised in Figure 1 .
DEVELOPMENT OF 'LOSS OF CHANCE' IN CASE LAW IN AUSTRALIA
The concept of loss of chance exists in Australian commercial law where, but for the breach by the defendant, the plaintiff would have had a better chance of success with a commercial opportunity 10 . This opened the way for proportional damages where negligence could be proven. Following a series of unsuccessful cases 8, 9 , this concept was successfully translated to medical negligence in the case of Rufo v Hosking 11 . The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's negligent prescribing in relation to her systemic lupus erythematosus resulted in vertebral fractures. It was found that the plaintiff had failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant's breach caused or contributed materially to the injury sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed this decision on the basis that the negligence resulted in the loss of a chance that the vertebral fractures may not have occurred or may not have been as severe 12 . The Court of Appeal found for the appellant with costs and directed the primary judge to determine the damages on the basis of the loss of a chance.
Commentators were concerned that the bar had now been lowered for plaintiffs to succeed, that a torrent of cases based on loss of chance would overwhelm the legal and professional indemnity insurance systems and that the practice of defensive medicine would be promoted 13 . Tibballs observed that 13 :
The quantification of a chance of a better outcome appears to be a very low hurdle for the plaintiff, particularly if costs are allowed, and very high for the defendant. It is unlikely that a plaintiff will fail if there is any chance greater than inconsequential of a better outcome, provided negligence is proven. Loss of chance was further tested in the case of Tabet v Gett 14 . It was alleged that Dr Gett had been negligent in failing to order a computerised tomography scan to rule out raised intracranial pressure when Reema Tabet, a six-year-old girl, presented to him with persistent headaches following a varicella infection. The computerised tomography scan, which revealed a brain tumour, was not performed until after the patient had a seizure. Whilst a breach in the duty of care in not ordering the computerised tomography scan and treating the raised intracranial pressure was proven, causation of the patient's subsequent disability was not, as this was thought more likely to have resulted from the brain tumour and the (non-negligent) surgery than the breach. However, his Honour found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for loss of a chance of a better outcome had the breach not occurred and decided that the breach contributed 25% to the ultimate outcome and of that 40% resulted from her loss of chance. This amounted to $610,000-clearly a disappointment to Reema Tabet's carers and Dr Gett, as they both chose to appeal 15 .
The Court of Appeal determined that the authorities on which the case was based 12, 16 were "plainly wrong" because they altered the principle of causation on the balance of probabilities to the realm of possibilities, that there was no "compelling reason" to change this principle and that they were inconsistent with civil liability legislation as to the type of harm required to justify a finding of negligence 17 . This decision was upheld on appeal to the High Court of Australia 1 . Gummow J (at [59]), one of the presiding judges, characterised this decision as leading to "rough justice" but went on to remark that the traditional "balance of probabilities" approach represents: …a balance between the competing interests of the parties, [whereas] the substitution of the loss of a chance as the actionable damage represents a shift in that balance towards claimants 1 .
The Court also pointed out that loss of chance had not been supported in comparable common law jurisdictions overseas 18, 19 and that such a radical change was the business of legislators and not the courts:
From the present vantage point, the alteration to the common law urged by the appellant is radical, and not incremental, and is therefore the kind of change to the common law which is, generally speaking, the business of Parliament. (Crennan J at [102])
With the High Court decision, it seemed to many that loss of a chance was a lost cause of action, and Grattan-Smith suggested the best avenue of redress for some patients may now be the National Disability Insurance Scheme 20 . However, as Walsh and Walsh 21 pointed out, there may be several situations in which loss of chance may still succeed or where alternative actions to causation may apply: • where the breach results in an increased risk of injury, • where there is a loss of greater than a 50% chance of a better medical outcome, and • contractual claims for loss of chance.
These authors pointed out that an argument about loss of chance of a better outcome may still be persuasive in cases that are settled out of court and believed that it would be necessary to await further cases that may clarify the High Court's opinion on loss of chance 21 .
LOSS OF CHANCE POST-TABET V GETT
Loss of chance is yet to be reconsidered by the High Court after Tabet v Gett; however, several interesting cases have arisen in lower courts and out of court. None of these have involved anaesthetists.
Out of court settlement in favour of Ms Rosemary Morley

Ms Rosemary Morley's claim against Melbourne
Pathology was settled out of court 22 . The pathologist involved failed to diagnose cancer in a breast lump removed in 1998. The cancer was removed eight years later when it was more advanced and when extensive adjuvant therapy was required. The plaintiff alleged pain and suffering due to the extensive treatment and loss of the chance of a better outcome (even though the ultimate injury, premature death, had not yet occurred). The weight given to the existing injuries (pain and suffering) and anticipated injuries (further treatment and death) in the negotiations between the parties has not been made public.
Paul v Cooke [2013]
In Paul v Cooke 23 , Mrs Paul sued Dr Cooke, a radiologist, for failing to diagnose a cerebral aneurysm. When the aneurysm was eventually diagnosed and treated by 'coiling', Mrs Paul suffered a stroke due to intra-procedure aneurysmal rupture. Mrs Paul asserted that had she been diagnosed earlier she would have been offered, and would have accepted, a different procedure ('clipping') and rupture would have been extremely unlikely. His Honour concluded that, whilst a breach had occurred, the scope of Dr Cooke's liability did not extend to the outcome of a procedure conducted by someone else that arose from his diagnosis. Dr Cooke's negligence created a risk of spontaneous rupture, but because spontaneous rupture had not and may never have occurred, Mrs Paul had no avenue to sue Dr Cooke on this basis 1 . Mrs Cooke appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal 24 and lost. Among other remarks, Basten JA [at 6] commented that:
…damages are not recoverable for the loss of such a chance unless the better outcome is the probable result… It should follow that where the conduct of a medical practitioner, albeit negligent, did nothing at all to increase the risk of particular harm materialising, that practitioner cannot be liable for the adverse outcome which in fact eventuated.
CONCLUSIONS
The decision of the High Court in Tabet v Gett 1 is consistent with authorities in some comparable common law countries like England; it does not go beyond provisions set out in civil liability legislation and it limits claims for damages in relation to hypothetical events that are yet to occur. We do not believe that modification of loss of chance will result in anaesthetists being less careful with patients whose chance of a better outcome is not greater than even (i.e. not >50%), as has been suggested by one commentator 25 . Anaesthetists' codes of conduct, both professional 26,27 and individual, seek to prevent such behaviour. Anaesthetists should be aware that, in negligence matters, acts or omissions that affect the patient's chance of a better outcome may result in a re-exploration of that avenue for damages and that this possibility would drive up indemnity costs.
